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An Information-Based Approach to 
Consciousness: Mental State Decoding
John-Dylan Haynes
The debate on the neural correlates of visual consciousness often focuses on the
question of which additional processing has to happen for a visual representation
to enter consciousness. However, a related question that has only rarely been ad-
dressed is which brain regions directly encode specific contents of consciousness.
The search for these core neural correlates of contents of consciousness (NCCCs)
requires  establishing  a  mapping  between  sensory  experiences  and  population
measures of brain activity in specific brain regions. One approach for establishing
this mapping is multivariate decoding. Using this technique, several properties of
NCCCs have been investigated. Masking studies have revealed that information
about sensory stimuli can be decoded from the primary visual cortex, even if the
stimuli cannot be consciously identified by a subject. This suggests that informa-
tion that does not reach awareness can be encapsulated in early visual stages of
processing. Visual imagery representations and veridical perception share similar
neural representations in higher-level visual regions, suggesting that these re-
gions are directly related to the encoding of conscious visual experience. But pop-
ulation signals in these higher-level visual regions cannot be the sole carriers of
visual experiences because they are invariant to low-level visual  features.  We
found no evidence for increased encoding of sensory information in the prefrontal
cortex when a stimulus reaches awareness. In general, we found no role of the
prefrontal cortex in encoding sensory experiences at all. However, the improved
discrimination  of  sensory  information  during  perceptual  learning  could  be  ex-
plained by an improved read-out by the prefrontal cortex. One possible implica-
tion is that prefrontal cortical regions do not participate in the encoding of sens-
ory features per se. Instead they may be relevant in making decisions about sens-
ory features, without exhibiting a re-representation of sensory information.
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1 Introduction
Neural theories of visual consciousness frequently
focus on the question of  what is  needed for a
visual stimulus to enter consciousness. A common
notion  is  that  representations  and processes  in
sensory regions of the brain can operate outside of
conscious perception, and that some “extra prop-
erty of processing” has to come on top in order to
let  these representations enter conscious experi-
ence (e.g., Dehaene & Naccache 2001). This extra
processing property can range from neural syn-
chronization  of  neurons  encoding  the  stimulus
(Engel &  Singer 2001),  recurrent and feedback
processing (Lamme 2006, this collection; Pascual-
Leone &  Walsh 2001;  Singer this collection), to
participation in a global coherent process, known
as neuronal workspace theories (Baars 2002; De-
haene & Naccache 2001). Discussion of the neural
correlates of consciousness (NCC) has often fo-
cused on this extra ingredient needed to bring a
stimulus representation into consciousness. How-
ever, a related, but somewhat different question
has often been neglected: Which neural represent-
ations (can) precisely participate in encoding the
various dimensions of conscious experience? For
this  it  is  not enough to establish a correlation
between conscious perception and neural signals.
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That would yield a far too large set of candidate
brain regions,  including,  say,  signal  patterns in
the retina that also correlate with conscious per-
ception. Instead, it would be desirable to identify
which neural representations most closely encode
specific contents of consciousness and can be used
to explain dimensions of conscious perception un-
der as many different conditions as possible, and
down to the level of single contents. This article
will focus on how to identify such core neural cor-
relates  of  contents  of  consciousness  (NCCCs;
Chalmers 2000; Block 2007; Koch 2004).
It is desirable that studies of visual aware-
ness take NCCCs into account because specific
theories of visual awareness make specific predic-
tions regarding the encoding and distribution of
sensory information (e.g.,  Dehaene &  Naccache
2001; see also Baars 2002). In the following, I will
first  outline  the  more  standard  techniques  for
identifying  NCCCs,  along with their  shortcom-
ings. The next step proposes to use multivariate
decoding techniques (reviewed e.g., in  Haynes &
Rees 2006) as a tool to identify NCCCs. Decod-
ing can serve as an empirical technique that can
establish which brain regions bear most informa-
tion about specific contents of visual experience.
This is an important first step towards establish-
ing a more rigid mapping between visual phenom-
enal  states  and  content-encoding  brain  signals.
Then, several examples will be presented where
multivariate  decoding  of  visual  experiences  can
help inform specific questions regarding NCCCs,
such as whether information in V1 participates in
visual awareness, whether imagery and perception
share  the  same  underlying  neural  codes,  or
whether  the prefrontal cortex contains any dy-
namic NCCCs for coding specific dimensions of
conscious experience. 
2 Why content matters: Binocular rivalry 
and the multiple levels of conscious 
experience
In 1996 Nikos Logothetis & David Leopold pub-
lished a landmark study on the neural mechan-
isms of visual awareness. They presented their
participating  monkeys  with  a  very  elaborate
visual stimulus display, which allowed them to
show one image to one eye and another image
to  the  other  eye.  For  example,  the  left  eye
might be stimulated with a line pattern tilted to
the left, and the right eye might be stimulated
with a line pattern tilted to the right. In such
cases,  where  conflicting  input  is  presented  to
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Glossary
Neural encoding The representation of a sensory feature in a population of neurons.
Mental state decoding Inferring the representational content of a mental state from a brain activation 
pattern, typically using multivariate pattern classification.
Neural correlate of a content of 
consciousness
The brain signal that encodes a specific aspect of conscious experience. The brain 
signal is the carrier, the specific aspect of consciousness constitutes the phenom-
enal representational content carried (in short, its “phenomenal content”).
Multivariate pattern classification A mathematical procedure for identifying patterns of brain activity, the labels of 
which have been previously learned.
Mapping The assignment of brain activation patterns to the representational content of 
mental states.
Low-level visual features Simple dimensions of visual experience that are encoded in early visual brain re-
gions (e.g., contrast, orientation). If consciously represented, they may constitute 
corresponding simple forms of phenomenal content.
High-level visual features More complex dimensions of visual experience that are encoded in downstream 
visual brain regions (e.g., object identity) and that are to some degree independ-
ent of the low-level features by which they are defined.
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the two eyes, human participants don’t experi-
ence a fusion between the two images. Instead,
conscious visual  perception alternates  between
phases  where  one  of  the  eyes’  inputs  become
visible and phases where the other eye’s input
are seen. Perception waxes and wanes more or
less  randomly between two perceptual  experi-
ences—despite  constant  stimulation.  Similarly,
the monkeys that were exposed to these binocu-
lar  rivalry  stimuli  indicated  behaviorally  by
pressing levers that their perception alternated
between the inputs to the two eyes.
In parallel,  Leopold &  Logothetis (1996)
investigated what happened to the firing pat-
terns of single neurons in the monkeys’ brains.
Their setup allowed them to not just look at
one location in the brain, but to assess neural
correlates in several visual brain regions. They
found only a small percentage of single neurons
in early visual cortex (V1/V2) whose firing pat-
tern was modulated by the stimulus that was
currently  dominant.  In  contrast,  in  a  higher-
level  visual  area—V4—they  found  that  many
more  cells  changed  their  firing  rates  with
changes in perception. This establishes a clear
dissociation  between  early  visual  areas  where
neural signals seem not to correlate with aware-
ness and high visual areas where they do. In a
follow-up  experiment,  Sheinberg &  Logothetis
(1997)  investigated  the  involvement  of  even
higher visual regions in the temporal cortex in
binocular rivalry. Because cells in these regions
preferentially respond to more elaborate visual
features, they used complex shapes and images,
such as, for example, an abstract sunburst pat-
tern or a picture of a monkey face (Figure 1a).
They found that in the superior temporal sulcus
and in the inferior temporal cortex, a large per-
centage of cells modulated their firing rate with
perceptual  dominance.  Taken  together,  these
studies  seem to suggest  that  visual  awareness
affects signals only at late stages of the visual
system. 
But what does it mean exactly that visual
awareness only affects late stages of visual pro-
cessing?  Does  it  mean  that  high  level  visual
areas contain all the neural correlates of con-
tents consciousness (NCCCs), in a way similar
to a CD encoding the contents of  a piece of
music? If the signals in these high visual areas
are really responsible for encoding all contents
of visual experiences then any aspect of con-
scious perception that changes during binocu-
lar rivalry should be explainable by changes in
signals  in  these  higher-level  brain  regions.
There are reasons to believe that this cannot
be the case. Consider the two images as shown
in Figure 1a. At one instant the monkey might
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Figure 1: Binocular rivalry and levels of perception. (a) Two conflicting stimuli, one presented to the left and one to
the right eye, lead to a perceptual alternation between phases where the input of either the left or right eye is con -
sciously seen. In monkey single-cell electrophysiology, this perceptual alternation has a correlate in higher-level visual
regions of the temporal lobe, but activity in earlier visual regions shows only small changes in activity patterns. Pre-
sumably, signals in the temporal cortex encode the complex figural properties of the stimuli, such as the left being a
sunburst pattern and the right being an image of a monkey face. However, due to the invariance of brain responses in
higher-level visual regions to low-level features, this cannot explain the perceptual difference between the rivalry of the
left and of the right sunburst pattern shown in (b), where the central circle has changed colour but the entire shape re-
mains similar (monkey illustration by Chris Huh, Wikimedia Commons). 
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consciously  see  the  face  image.  This  percept
would be encoded in activity patterns in the
higher  visual  areas.  In  the  next  instant  the
monkey might see a sunburst pattern, and this
experience would also be encoded in the higher
visual cortex. At first sight this seems reason-
able.  Higher-level  visual  areas  are  specialized
for complex visual information and object fea-
tures (Sáry et al. 1993). So cells that have a
preference for faces might respond during dom-
inance of the face image, and cells with a pref-
erence  for  sunburst  patterns  might  respond
during  the  dominance  of  that  pattern.  But
there  is  one  difficulty  in  this  interpretation.
The images have a high-level interpretation as
complex shapes, but they are also composed of
a  multitude  of  minute  visual  features,  edges,
surfaces, colours, etc. During rivalry, our per-
ception does not only change according to the
abstract  interpretation,  with  respect  to  ab-
stract,  high-level  interpretation,  but  also  in
terms  of  the  minute,  fine-grained  details  of
visual experience (see Figure 1b). 
This poses a problem because responses
in higher-level visual areas are invariant with
respect to low-level features (Sáry et al. 1993).
Cells in higher-level visual areas in the inferior
temporal cortex respond selectively to specific
object features in an invariant pattern (Figure
2).  A  cell  specialized  for  detecting,  say,  a
circle,  will  respond to this  circle  irrespective
of the low-level features by which it is defined
(here  brightness,  contrast,  and  colour  con-
trast). This means that such a cell disregards
the low-level features and does not convey in-
formation about them any more.  While  cells
in high-level visual areas might be able to ex-
plain  why we see  a  face  one  moment  and a
sunburst  pattern  the  next,  they  cannot  ex-
plain why the sunburst  pattern is  yellow in-
stead of red, or why it is one specific visual
pixel collection out of the many possible that
would  be  seen  as  a  sunburst  pattern.  Thus,
visual experience is a multilevel phenomenon,
and a theory of the neural correlates of visual
awareness will have to be able to explain all
the levels of our experience, not just one. This
clearly  shows  the  importance  of  a  content-
based approach to visual consciousness.
Figure  2:  Invariance of single-cell  responses in higher-
level  visual  areas.  Responses  in  low-level  visual  areas
(top) are tuned to low-level features such as colour or lu-
minance. In contrast, responses in higher-level object-se-
lective regions (bottom) are largely invariant with respect
to these low-level features (Sáry et al. 1993).
3 Approaches to content-selectivity in 
human neuroimaging and their 
problems
The limited resolution of current neuroimaging
techniques poses a substantial problem for the
investigation of the encoding of contents in the
human brain, and thus for studies on NCCCs in
the human brain. The most important format in
which information is coded in the brain is the
cortical  column  (Fujita et  al. 1992).  Cortical
columns consist of small groupings of cells with
similar tuning properties, clustered together at
a scale of around half a millimetre. Even func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) does
not routinely have a sufficient resolution to se-
lectively study the activation of individual cor-
tical columns (but see e.g.,  Yacoub et al. 2008
for recent progress).  For this reason, most re-
search into perceptual contents has relied on ex-
perimental  “tricks”  that  allow the tracking  of
contents indirectly. 
In  frequency tagging,  a visual stimulus is
tagged  with  a  specific  and unique  flicker  fre-
quency. This then allows for tracing of the pro-
cessing of this stimulus by searching for brain
signals that exhibit the same flicker frequency.
This approach has been used to study binocular
rivalry, but in quite a different way to that un-
dertaken  by  Leopold &  Logothetis (1996).
Tononi et al. (1998) tagged the inputs of  the
two eyes with different frequencies. They found
that the currently dominant percept was accom-
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panied by wide-spread increases in Magnetoen-
cephalography (MEG)-signals at the tagged fre-
quency across multiple brain regions, mostly in
the early visual and temporal cortex. This is a
very powerful approach and it reveals how wide-
spread the effects are when a stimulus reaches
visual awareness. However, it is not always clear
whether these findings indicate that the corres-
ponding perceptual  features  of  the  stimuli,  in
this case the orientation of line elements, really
are distributed throughout the brain. The key
problem is that the feature that is traced (the
frequency) is not the main feature that is per-
ceptually relevant (orientation). One could ima-
gine, say, that activity in higher-level brain re-
gions that exhibits the frequency of the domin-
ant  stimulus might not  be involved in coding
the  sensory  content,  but  instead  in  detecting
the presence of a change in the visual image, ir-
respective of what the corresponding feature is.
The frequency-tagging approach does not allow
for distinguishing between these alternatives.
Another approach to tracking content-se-
lective  processing  is  to  use  stimuli  that  are
known  to  activate  specific  content-selective
brain  regions (Tong et  al. 1998;  Rees et  al.
2000).  For  example,  in  a  study  on  binocular
rivalry, Tong et al. (1998) used faces and houses
as rivalry stimuli. These stimuli are known to
activate  different  brain  regions,  the  fusiform
face area (FFA) and the parahippocampal place
area (PPA). They found that activity in a con-
tent-selective region increased when the corres-
ponding  stimulus  became perceptually  domin-
ant. This goes further than the frequency-tag-
ging approach in that it allows for drawing the
plausible conclusion that awareness leads to in-
creased  activity  in  content-selective  regions.
However, this approach again suffers from sev-
eral problems. First, it only allows us to address
the hypothesis  related to very specific  stimuli
(typically faces and houses) and to very specific
brain  regions.  Because  the  approach relies  on
the  existence  of  macroscopic  content-selective
regions,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  test
whether,  say,  the  prefrontal  cortex,  receives
sensory  information  when  a  stimulus  reaches
awareness. A further problem is that the high
selectivity of FFA and PPA has long been ques-
tioned (Haxby et al. 2001). 
4 Mapping and decoding 
It seems a different, more direct, and generic ap-
proach is necessary in order to identify the neural
correlates of the contents of consciousness. It may
help to start in the simplest possible way. If we
want to explain the occurrence of a conscious ex-
perience E1 with the occurrence of a brain state
B1 then—roughly speaking—the experience and
the brain state should always happen together. If
we want to explain N experiences E1…N with brain
states, we will need N different brain states B1…N
in order to encode the different experiences.  If
brain data from a specific area only adopts one of
five states every time a participant has one of ten
experiences it is impossible to explain the experi-
ences  through  the  different  brain  states.  Ulti-
mately  this  boils  down to  a  mapping problem
(Haynes 2009; Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Principles of mapping between mental states and brain states (see text; adapted from Haynes 2009 with ad-
ditional images from Wikipedia).
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A set of conscious sensations, here visual
percepts  of  six  different  animals,  can  be  en-
coded  in  a  neural  carrier  in  multiple  ways.
Three  principles  are  illustrated  in  Figure  3a.
One hypothetical way to code these six animals
would be to use a single neuron and to encode
the objects by the firing rates of this neuron.
One would assign one specific firing rate to each
of  the different  animals,  say 1Hz to  the dog,
2Hz to the cat and 3Hz to the mouse, etc. This
approach  is  also  referred  to  as  a  univariate
code, because it uses only one single parameter
of neural activity. It has the advantage of re-
quiring only a single neuron. In  principle it is
possible to encode many different objects with a
single neuron. The idea would be very similar to
a telephone number, if  one thinks of different
numbers corresponding to different firing rates.
In theory it would be possible to encode every
single  telephone  in  the  world  in  this  way,
provided that the firing rates could be estab-
lished  very  precisely  and  reliably.  The  disad-
vantage with this approach—even if firing rates
could  be  established  with  great  precision—is
that it can only handle  exclusive thoughts, i.e.
it has no way of dealing with a superposition of
different animals, say a cat together with a dog.
A different approach is not to use a single
neuron to encode different thoughts, but instead
to  use  a  set  of  neurons  to  encode  a  set  of
thoughts.  This  population-based  approach  is
also termed “multivariate”. One way to encode
thoughts about six different animals would be
to assign one specific neuron to the occurrence
of  each  thought.  Neuron  one,  say,  might  fire
when a person thinks about a dog; neuron two
would fire when they were thinking about a cat,
etc.  Here  the  firing  rate  is  irrelevant;  only  a
threshold is needed, such that one has a way of
deciding when a neuron is “active” or “not act-
ive”.  This  specific  coding  scheme  is  variably
termed “sparse code”, “labelled line code”, “car-
dinal cell code” or “grandmother cell code” (see
e.g., Quiroga et al. 2008). It has the advantage
of being able to handle arbitrary superpositions
and  combinations  of  thoughts,  say  thoughts
about a meeting of a dog, a cat, and a mouse. A
disadvantage  is  that  a  different  neuron  is
needed for the encoding of each new entity. N
neurons can only encode N different thoughts.
Given that the average human brain comprises
86  billion  neurons  (Azevedo et  al. 2009)  this
might not seem too big a problem. A different
way to use a population of neurons to encode a
set of thoughts would be a distributed multivari-
ate code. Here, each mental state is associated
with a single activation pattern in the neural
population, but now arbitrary combinations of
neurons are possible  for the encoding of  each
single thought. This allows for the encoding of
2N thoughts with N neurons, if each neuron is
only considered to be “on” or “off”.
There are various examples of these differ-
ent  types  of  codes.  The encoding of  intensity
follows  a  univariate  code:  The  difference
between a brighter and a darker image is en-
coded in a higher versus a lower firing rate of
the corresponding neurons in the visual cortex
(see e.g., Haynes 2009). However, to date, I am
not  aware  of  any  example  where  different
higher-level interpretations of stimuli are coded
in  a  univariate  format.  There  are  many  ex-
amples  of  labelled  line  codes.  The retinotopic
location within the visual field is encoded in a
sparse, labelled line format (e.g.,  Sereno et al.
1995). One position in the visual field is coded
by one set of neurons in the early visual cortex;
another position is encoded by a different set of
neurons. If two objects appear in the visual field
simultaneously, then both of the corresponding
sets of neurons become active simultaneously. A
similar coding principle is observed for auditory
pitch, where different pitches are coded in dif-
ferent  cells  in  the  form  of  a  tonotopic  map
(Formisano et al. 2003). The somatosensory and
motor homunculi are also examples of labelled
line  codes,  each  position  in  the  brain  corres-
ponding  to  one  specific  position  in  the  body
(Penfield &  Rasmussen 1950).  A  distributed
multivariate code is, for example, used to code
different objects (Haxby et al. 2001) or different
emotions (Anders et al. 2011).
When  identifying  the  mapping  between
brain states and mental states one is generally
interested in identifying which specific popula-
tion of neurons is a suitable candidate for ex-
plaining a particular class of visual experiences.
For this it is possible to formulate a number of
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constraints (Haynes 2009).  First,  the mapping
needs to assign one brain state to each mental
state in which we are interested. In other words,
the mapping has to be total (Figure 3b). This
should be easy—it just means that we can as-
sign one measured brain state to each different
mental state.  Second, the mapping cannot as-
sign the same brain state to two different men-
tal states. Otherwise the brain states would not
be able to explain the different mental states.
Technically this means the mapping has to be
invertible, or injective. Every brain state should
be assigned to no more than one mental state.
However, it is possible—in the sense of multiple
realisation—that  multiple  brain  states  are  as-
signed  to  the  same  mental  state,  as  long  as
neither  of  these  brain  states  co-occurs  with
other mental states. The brain states referred to
here only mean brain states that are relevant
for explaining a set of mental states. If we want
to explain thoughts about six animals,  say, it
might not be necessary that brain states in the
motor cortex are different for the different an-
imals. However, if one wants to propose one set
of  neurons  (say,  those  in  the  lateral  occipital
complex, Malach et al. 1995) as a candidate for
explaining  animal  experiences,  then  this  can
only  hold  if  the  abovementioned mapping  re-
quirements are fulfilled.
In practice it will be very difficult to es-
tablish this mapping directly. One major prob-
lem is that we can’t measure brain states in suf-
ficient  detail  with  current  neuroscience  tech-
niques.  Non-invasive  measurement  techniques
such as electroencepholography (EEG) or func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have
very  limited  spatial  resolution.  FMRI  for  ex-
ample  resolves  the  brain with a measurement
grid of around 1–3mm, so that each measure-
ment unit (or voxel)  contains up to a million
cells. And the temporal resolution of fMRI is re-
stricted because fMRI measures the delayed and
temporally-extended hemodynamic response to
neural  stimulation.  While  it  is  possible—to
some degree—to reconstruct visual experiences
from fMRI signals (e.g.,  Miyawaki et al. 2008),
fMRI cannot resolve temporal details of neural
processes, such as the synchronized activity of
multiple cells. But it is not only EEG and fMRI
that have limited resolution: Invasive recording
techniques are typically restricted to individual
well-circumscribed  locations,  where  surgery  is
performed. And even with multielectrodes it is
not possible to identify the state of each indi-
vidual neuron in a piece of living tissue. 
Another  important  limitation  lies  in  our
ability to precisely characterize and cognitively
penetrate  phenomenal  states (e.g.,  Raffman
1995).  There  is  currently  no  psychophysical
technique that  would allow us to characterize
the full details of a person’s visual experiences
at each location in the visual field. Verbal re-
ports or button presses can convey only a very
reduced picture of the true complexity of visual
experiences. So ultimately, the mapping requires
precision  from  both  psychology  and  neuros-
cience, and any imprecision in either approach
will blur the mapping and distort the interpret-
ation.
The next best option short of establishing
full mapping is to use decoding techniques that
follow a similar logic.  Brain-based decoding is
also  referred  to  as  “brain  reading”  or  “mul-
tivoxel  pattern  analysis”  (see  Haynes &  Rees
2005 for a review). The basic idea is to see to
which  degree  it  is  possible  to  infer  a  mental
state from a measurement of a brain state. Say
you want to test whether the lateral occipital
complex  is  a  suitable  candidate  for  encoding
visual thoughts about animals. You test if it is
possible to infer which animal a person is cur-
rently seeing by training a classifier to learn the
association between animal and brain activation
pattern, and then one needs to test whether the
classifier  can correctly  assign  the animal  that
belongs to a new measurement of brain activity.
In the following, this approach will be explained
in detail.
Take  for  example  a  hypothetical  fMRI-
measurement of the human brain within a three
by three grid  of  locations,  amounting to nine
voxels  (Figure  4a).  These  nine  voxels  can  be
systematically resorted into a column of num-
bers (or vectors), where each entry denotes the
activation at one location (high values corres-
pond to strong fMRI responses). Say one was
interested in testing whether these nine voxels
contain information about two different visual
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images, perhaps a dog and a cat. The question
that needs to be addressed is whether the re-
sponse  patterns  (i.e.,  the  vectors)  are  suffi-
ciently  different  to  allow  for  distinguishing
between  the  animals,  based  on  these  brain
activity measurements alone. The vector is not
a useful way to see whether this classification is
possible. It can help to visualize the same in-
formation in a two-dimensional coordinate sys-
tem. Take the responses to the dog. One can
think of the first and second entries in the vec-
tor as x- and y-values that define points in a co-
ordinate system. The response in the first voxel
(x)  to  the  dog  is  a  low value  (2),  while  the
second value (y) is a high value (8). When plot-
ted  in  a  two-dimensional  coordinate  system
(Figure 4b), this yields a point in the top left of
the coordinate system, shown here in red. Re-
peated measurements of the brain response to
the dog yield a small cloud of red points. Re-
peatedly  measured  brain responses  to the cat
have high values in voxel 1 (x) and low values in
voxel 2 (y). In the two-dimensional coordinate
system this yields a cloud of blue points in the
bottom right of the coordinate system. Clearly
the responses are separable in this two-dimen-
sional coordinate system, so the two animals en-
joy reliably  separate  neural  representations  in
this set of nine voxels. In this hypothetical ex-
ample, each of the two voxels alone would be
sufficiently  informative  about  the  category  of
animal. By collapsing the points for voxel one
onto the x-axis it becomes clear that the two
distributions of points (red and blue) are suffi-
ciently  different  to  allow  for  telling  the  two
apart.  The  same  holds  for  voxel  two  by  col-
lapsing to the y-axis. This is akin to a labelled
line code, with one line for “dog” and one line
for “cat”. 
However,  there  are  cases  where  the  two
distributions  will  not  be  so  easily  separable.
Figure  4c shows  an  example  where  the  indi-
vidual voxels do not have information about the
animals. The collapsed or “marginal” distribu-
tions largely overlap. There is no way to tell a
cat response from a dog response by looking at
either voxel one or two alone. However, by tak-
ing  into  account  the  joint  activity in  both
voxels,  the two animals  become clearly separ-
able. Responses to the dog all cluster to the top
left  of  the  diagonal  and responses  to the cat
cluster to its bottom right. This joint considera-
tion  of  the  information  contained  in  multiple
voxels is the underlying principle of  multivari-
ate decoding. The line separating the two distri-
butions is known as the decision boundary. De-
cision  boundaries  are  not  necessarily  straight
lines. Many other types of distributions of re-
sponses  are  possible.  Figure  4d,  for  example,
shows a non-linear decision boundary. Finding
the optimal decision boundary is the key object-
ive in the field of machine learning (Müller et
al. 2001), where many different types of classifi-
ers have been developed (most well known are
support vector classifiers). In order to identify
the  decision  boundary  the  available  data  are
split into training and test data. The test data
are  put  aside  and only  the  training  data  are
then used to find a decision boundary, as, for
example, is shown in Figure 4e. The crucial test
is then performed with the remaining test data.
The classifier is applied to these data to see to
which degree it is able to correctly assign the la-
bels. Depending on which side of the decision
boundary a test data point falls upon, it will
yield either a correct or an incorrect classifica-
tion.
Please  note  the  similarity  between  the
mapping of mental states and brain states. The
red cloud of points in Figure 4b shows a two-di-
mensional response pattern that corresponds to
the neural code for percepts of dogs. The spread
of the point cloud (i.e. the fact that repeated
measurements don’t yield identical values) could
mean  two  things.  Either  the  spread  reflects
noise and uncertainty that is typically inherent
in measurements of neural data. This could, for
example, reflect the fact that single fMRI voxels
can  sample  many thousand cells,  only  few of
which  might  be  involved  in  processing.  Addi-
tionally, physiological background rhythms can
influence  the  signals  and  contribute  to  noise
(Fox et  al. 2006).  Alternatively,  however,  the
spread of the points could also be an inherent
property of the representation. This would sug-
gest that every time a person sees or visual ima-
gines a dog, a slightly different activation pat-
tern is observed in the brain. This would then
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be  evidence  of  multiple  realization.  Current
measurement techniques do not have sufficient
precision to distinguish between these two ac-
counts. One difference between the multivariate
mapping  shown in  Figure  3a (right)  and  the
classification in  Figure 4 is that the classifica-
tion shows response distributions where each in-
dividual variable (voxel,  channel)  can adopt a
graded value, whereas the values in  Figure 3a
(right) are only binary.
5 What does multivariate decoding 
reveal about NCCCs?
The importance of  information theory for un-
derstanding the neural correlates of conscious-
ness has been stressed repeatedly, most notably
by Giulio Tononi (2005). His information integ-
ration theory focuses on the information-based
properties  of  neural  processes  and  uses  these
special properties to provide a general explana-
tion of consciousness. In contrast, the multivari-
ate  decoding account presented here attempts
to solve the much more basic question of which
neural populations provide the best account for
which visual experiences. As mentioned above,
this can be thought of as a search for the core
neural correlates  of  the contents  of  conscious-
ness (NCCCs), which have been postulated in
similar  forms  by  previous  authors  (Chalmers
2000; Block 2007; Koch 2004). While these pro-
posals for core NCCCs have been influential in
theoretical  discussions  on  consciousness,  they
have only rarely been directly linked to neuros-
cience research, which requires spelling out how
the NCCC can be established in empirical data.
In the following, various studies of multivariate
decoding  from our lab will  be  presented  that
have implications for identifying NCCCs.
5.1 Example 1: Encapsulated information 
in V1
There has long been a debate as to whether the
primary visual cortex (V1) is a neural correlate
of  visual  consciousness.  Crick &  Koch (1995)
postulated that V1 does not encode visual ex-
periences for several reasons. First, V1 does not
have  the  anatomical  projections  to  the  pre-
frontal  cortex  that  would  allow  for  a  direct
read-out of information in V1. This would be
required to explain a key distinguishing feature
of conscious experiences: that we can voluntar-
ily act upon them. A second reason is that V1
encodes information of which we are not aware.
Psychophysical experiments, for example, show
that V1 can encode orientation information of
which we are not aware (He et al. 1996). We
thus directly assessed the link between informa-
tion  encoding  in  V1  and  visual  awareness
(Haynes & Rees 2005). Specifically, we investig-
ated the effects crossing the threshold to aware-
ness has on the neural coding of simple visual
features. Participants viewed oriented “grating”
images (Figure 5) and had to tell whether they
were tilted to the left or to the right. In one
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techniques (image adapted from Haynes & Rees 2005).
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condition the images were clearly visible, in the
other condition they were rendered invisible by
rapidly  alternating  the  orientation  stimulus
with a mask. In this condition participants were
not able to tell the difference between the two
orientation stimuli (Figure 5). 
We then applied a classifier to fMRI-sig-
nals from early visual regions V1, V2, and V3
to see if it would be possible to decode the ori-
entation of stimuli. We found that orientation
for the visible stimuli could be decoded from all
early visual regions, V1, V2, and V3 (Figure 5,
right). This is in line with previous research on
encoding  of  orientation  information  in  early
visual areas (Bartfeld &  Grinvald 1992). Inter-
estingly, we were able to decode the orientation
from V1 even for invisible stimuli. This means
that V1 presumably continues to carry low-level
feature  information  even  when  a  participant
can’t access this information. V2 and V3, how-
ever,  only had information for  visible  stimuli,
not for invisible stimuli. Please note that an al-
ternative interpretation could be that subjects
perceive the subtle differences between masked
stimuli, but they cannot report or reason about
them. However, in psychophysics an absence of
discriminability is typically considered a strong
criterion for absence of awareness. This finding
is  interesting  for  several  reasons.  First,  it
demonstrates that information can be encapsu-
lated in a person’s early visual cortex, without
them being able to access this information. This
suggests that V1 is not an NCCC for conscious
orientation  perception.  Second,  it  shows  that
one explanation why stimuli are rendered invis-
ible by visual masking is that the information
that  is  available  at  early  stages  of  processing
(V1) is not passed on to the next stages of pro-
cessing in V2 and V3. Similar encapsulation of
information has also been observed for parietal
extinction patients in  higher-level  visual  areas
with  more  conventional  neuroimaging  ap-
proaches (Rees et al. 2000). 
5.2 Example 2: Imagery and perception
There has also been a long debate on the neural
mechanisms underlying visual imagery. One im-
portant question is whether the NCCCs under-
lying imagery are the same—or at least overlap-
ping—with those for veridical perception. One
study (Kosslyn et al. 1995) found that imagery
activated even very early  stages of  the visual
cortex. This fits with a mechanism that encodes
visual images as a replay of representations of
veridical percepts. However, this does not reveal
whether the activation of the early visual cortex
really  participates  in  encoding  the  imagined
contents.  Instead,  these  regions  might  be  in-
volved in ensuring the correct spatial distribu-
tion of attention across the visual field (Tootell
et al. 1998). The question of whether the neural
representations  of  veridical  percepts  are  the
same as those for visual imaginations needs to
be established in addition. 
We conducted a study to directly address
the overlap of NCCCs for veridical perception
and imagery (Cichy et  al. 2012).  Participants
were positioned inside an MRI scanner and had
to perform one of two tasks: Either they were
asked to observe visual images presented to the
left or right of fixation (Figure 6), or they were
asked to imagine visual images in the same loc-
ations.  Twelve different images from four cat-
egories  were  used:  three  objects,  three  visual
Haynes, J. D. (2015). An Information-Based Approach to Consciousness: Mental State Decoding.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 17(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570276 10 | 19
Figure  5:  Decoding the orientation of invisible grating
stimuli  from patterns  of  activity  in  early  visual  areas.
Target stimuli were line patterns that were either tilted
top left to bottom right, or top right to bottom left. They
were rapidly alternated with mask stimuli so that parti-
cipants  were  unable  to  identify  the  target  orientation.
The classification accuracy for these “invisible” gratings
was above chance in area V1, but not in V2 or V3. For
visible  orientation  stimuli  the  classification  was  above
chance in all three early visual areas (figure taken from
Haynes & Rees 2005).
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scenes,  three body parts,  and three faces.  We
found that multiple higher-level visual  regions
had information about the images. Furthermore,
it was possible to decode seen visual images us-
ing a classifier that had only been trained on
imagined visual images. This suggests that im-
agery  and  veridical  perception  share  similar
neural  representations for perceptual  contents,
at least in high-level visual regions. Please note,
however,  that  the  cross-classification  between
veridical perception and imagery is not perfect.
It is currently unclear whether this reflects im-
perfections in the measurement of brain signals
with fMRI, or whether it reflects residual differ-
ences in the contents of consciousness between
imagery and veridical  perception,  for  example
the higher vividness of perception based on ex-
ternal visual stimuli (Perkey 1910).
5.3 Example 3: Perceptual learning
Another interesting riddle of sensory awareness
is  perceptual  learning  (Sagi 2011;  see  also
Lamme this collection). When we are first ex-
posed  to  a  novel  class  of  sensory  stimuli  our
ability to differentiate between nuances is highly
limited. When one tastes the first glass of wine,
all wines taste the same. But with increased ex-
posure and experience we learn to distinguish
even subtle differences between different wines.
The  interesting  question  here  is  whether  the
sensory information was there all along, and we
just failed to notice it, or whether the sensory
representation  of  the  wines  actually  improves
(see Dennett 1991). 
We  addressed  this  question,  but  with
visual grating stimuli instead of different wines
(Kahnt et al. 2011). Participants performed two
fMRI  sessions,  where  they  had  to  distinguish
small  differences  in  the  orientation  of  lines
presented  on  the  screen.  They  had  to  tell
whether they were rotated clockwise or counter-
clockwise  with  respect  to  a  template.  During
the first fMRI session their ability to distinguish
between the line patterns was quite limited. Af-
terwards we trained them in two sessions out-
side the MRI scanner on the same line patterns,
and their performance continually improved. In
a final second fMRI session they had then sub-
stantially  improved  their  ability  to  tell  even
subtle  differences  between  the  orientations
apart.  But  what  explains  this  improvement:
Better sensory coding, or better interpretation
of the information that was there all along?
To address this question we first looked into
the responses in the early visual cortex to the dif-
ferent line stimuli. As expected from our above-
mentioned study on orientation coding (Haynes &
Rees 2005), it was possible to decode the orienta-
tion of  the line  elements  from signals  in  early
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Figure 6: Visual imagery. (a) Visual stimuli used in the experiment consisted of three selections from four categories.
(b) In different trials participants either saw the images to the left or right of fixation or they received an auditory in -
struction to imagine a specific image. (c) A classifier trained on the brain responses of different imagined images could
be used able to correctly cross-classify which image a person was currently seeing on the screen in the perception condi -
tion. Information was higher for the images “preferred” by a visual area, but there was still information, esp. in FBA,
about  the non-preferred  categories  (FFA=fusiform face  area;  OFA=occipital  face  area;  FBA=fusiform body  area;
EBA=extrastriate body area; PPA=parahippocampal place area; TOS=transverse occipital sulcus)(figure from Cichy
et al. 2012).
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visual areas. It is well established that these areas
have information about such simple visual  fea-
tures (Bartfeld &  Grinvald 1992). However, we
found no improvement in our ability to decode
the orientation of the stimuli with learning. There
is  some divergence in  the literature with some
studies finding effects of learning in early sensory
areas (see Sasaki et al. 2010). Other recent find-
ings in monkeys are in line with our findings and
do not find improved information coding in sens-
ory areas (e.g., Law & Gold 2009). In our case, it
seems as if the sensory representation of orienta-
tion  remains  unchanged  and  that  some  other
mechanism has to be responsible for the improve-
ment in perceptual discrimination. We found a re-
gion in the medial prefrontal cortex where signals
followed the learning curve, thus suggesting that
the improvement was not so much a question of
stimulus coding but of the read-out of information
from the sensory system. This study suggests that
representation of a feature in an NCCC might not
automatically  guarantee  it  enters  visual  aware-
ness. 
5.4 Example 4: Invariance in human 
higher-level visual cortex
As mentioned above, one important challenge to
the idea that the contents of visual awareness
are encoded exclusively late in the visual system
is the invariance of responses to low-level visual
features (Sáry et al. 1993). We directly investig-
ated the invariance of fMRI responses in the re-
gions lateral occipital (LO) and fusiform gyrus
(FUS) of the higher-level object-selective visual
cortex (Malach et al. 1995;  Grill-Spector et al.
2001). In this study (Cichy et al. 2011) parti-
cipants viewed objects presented either to the
left or the right of the fixation spot (Figure 7).
These objects consisted of three different exem-
plars  from  four  different  categories  (animals,
planes, cars, and chairs). For example, the cat-
egory “animal”  contained  images  of  a  frog,  a
tortoise, and a cow. With these data we were
able to explore two different aspects of invari-
ance. First, we wanted to know whether object
representations are invariant to changes in spa-
tial location. This is important because a low-
level visual representation that focuses exclus-
ively on the distribution of light in the visual
field would not be able to generalize from one
position to another. So we assessed whether a
classifier trained to recognize an object at one
position in the visual field would be able to gen-
eralize to another position in the visual field.
We found that a classifier was able to generalize
to a different position, however with reduced ac-
curacy. This indicates that the representations
Haynes, J. D. (2015). An Information-Based Approach to Consciousness: Mental State Decoding.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 17(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570276 12 | 19
Figure 7: FMRI evidence for invariance of object-representations in the high-level visual regions lateral occipital (LO)
and fusiform gyrus (FUS) as compared to early visual cortex (EV; figure from Cichy et al. 2011).
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were at least partially invariant with respect to
low-level visual features. Next, we investigated
whether  the  representations  would  generalize
from one exemplar to another. This goes even
further in testing for the level of abstraction of
the representation. A classifier that can general-
ize not only to a different location but even to a
different exemplar (say from a frog to a cow)
needs to operate at a higher level of abstraction
that is largely independent from low-level visual
features. Again we found that the classifier was
able  to  generalize  between  exemplars  of  the
same category, further supporting the abstrac-
tion of representations in the higher visual re-
gions LO and FUS (Figure 7).  This  makes it
again less plausible that the contents of visual
awareness are encoded exclusively in the higher-
level visual cortex. Encoding in these regions is
invariant (or at least tolerant) to low-level fea-
ture changes, and thus this level of perceptual
experience has to be encoded at a different, pre-
sumably lower, level of visual processing.
5.5 Example 5: No sensory information in
PFC
A  further  case  where  multivariate  decoding
might inform theories  of  visual  awareness  be-
comes apparent when we confront the question
of  whether  sensory  information  is  distributed
throughout the brain when a stimulus crosses
the threshold of awareness. The global neuronal
workspace  theory  (e.g.,  Dehaene &  Naccache
2001; see also  Baars 2002) posits that sensory
signals are made globally available across large-
scale brain networks, especially in the prefrontal
and parietal  cortices,  when they reach aware-
ness.  An  interesting  and  open  question  is
whether  this  global  availability  of  sensory  in-
formation means that the sensory information
about a stimulus can be actually decoded from
these  prefrontal  and  parietal  brain  regions  to
which the information is made available. In the-
ory, one might be able to distinguish between a
“streaming model” of global availability, where
information is broadcast throughout the brain
(e.g., Baars 1988), and which should thus be de-
codable from multiple brain regions; an altern-
ative would be an “on demand” model of global
availability,  where  sensory  signals  are  only
propagated into prefrontal  and parietal cortex
when  selected  by  attention  (e.g.,  Dehaene &
Naccache 2001).
We performed three  fMRI studies  to  test
this question (Bode et al. 2012; Bode et al. 2013;
Hebart et al. 2012). In the first study (Bode et al.
2012), participants were briefly shown images of
pianos and chairs that were temporally embedded
in scrambled mask stimuli. There were two condi-
tions. In one condition, the timing of visual stim-
uli was chosen such that the target stimuli were
clearly visible. In the other condition, the timing
of scrambled masks and targets was such that the
targets were effectively rendered invisible. We at-
tempted to decode the sensory information about
the  presented objects.  Under high  visibility  we
were able to decode which image was being shown
from fMRI signals in the so-called lateral occipital
regions of the human brain, where complex object
recognition takes place. Under low visibility, there
was no information in these brain regions. This
suggests a possible mechanism for explaining why
the stimuli failed to reach awareness. Presumably
their  sensory  representations  were  already  can-
celled out  at  the visual  processing stages.  The
“streaming model” mentioned above would mean
that  sensory information about the object  cat-
egory is distributed into parietal and prefrontal
brain  regions  when  the  stimulus  crosses  the
threshold of awareness. However, we found no in-
formation in the prefrontal cortex—under either
high or  low visibility (Bode et  al. 2012).  This
finding was repeated in two different studies, one
also using objects as stimuli (Bode et al. 2013)
and one using drifting motion stimuli (Hebart et
al. 2012). In contrast, in animal studies sensory
information has been found in the prefrontal cor-
tex (Pasternak & Greenlee 2005). It is currently
unclear whether this reflects a species-difference
or whether it is due to limitations in the resolu-
tion of human neuroimaging techniques.
5.6 Example 6: Unconscious processing 
of preferences
It is well known that unattended and even in-
visible  visual  stimuli  can  undergo  substantial
processing.  We  investigated  whether  informa-
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tion about high-level,  more  interpretative  and
subjective  properties  of  visual  stimuli  would
also be traceable using decoding techniques. For
this we aimed to decode the degree to which
preferences for certain visually presented images
of cars can be decoded, even when these stimuli
were  unattended  and  were  not  task-relevant
(Tusche et al. 2010). 
For this experiment we carefully pre-selec-
ted  our  participants,  who  were  self-reporting
car-enthusiasts. Then we ensured that we chose
stimuli where different participants had maxim-
ally-divergent opinions as to which car they pre-
ferred. This was necessary in order to de-correl-
ate the classification of the preference from the
classification  of  the  specific  vehicles.  Subjects
were divided into two groups. Participants from
the first group were presented with the car im-
ages in the scanner and had to actively evaluate
whether they liked them. The second group was
also  presented  with  the  car  images,  but  they
were distracted from them. They were required
to solve a very difficult task that required them
to focus their attention elsewhere in the visual
field,  on  fixation.  The  car  stimuli  were  thus
task-irrelevant and presented outside of the at-
tentional focus. This group of subjects could not
recall which cars had been shown during the ex-
periment, suggesting that they were indeed not
actively deliberating about the cars. After the
experiment, participants from both groups were
asked to rate how much they would like to buy
each  car.  This  served  as  a  gold  standard  for
their preference.
We  then  tried  to  decode  whether  indi-
vidual subjects liked the cars or not. For this,
we  looked  into  patterns  of  brain  activity
throughout the brain, to see where there might
be information regarding preferences. This was
done  in  order  to  reduce  the  bias  when  only
looking  into  pre-specified  brain  regions.  We
found that it was possible to decode the pre-
ferred cars  with 75% accuracy from brain re-
gions far outside the visual system, in the me-
dial prefrontal and in the insular cortex. This
was true for the subjects who had been actively
deliberating about their preferences for the cars,
but also for the participants who been distrac-
ted from thinking about them. Presumably, this
means  that  the  brain  automatically  processes
the car-images all the way up to the stage of en-
coding preferences, even in the absence of visual
attention. Please note that this finding of  pref-
erence information  in  the  prefrontal  cortex  is
quite different to that in the previous experi-
ment, where there was no  sensory information
in PFC. Here, in contrast, there is information
in PFC, but (a) not about a sensory property
and (b) even for unattended stimuli.  Thus, it
appears  that  the  informational  dividing  line
between sensory and prefrontal brain regions is
not one of awareness, but rather one of the type
of information coded.
6 Complicating factors
When searching for the neural correlates of con-
tents of consciousness (NCCCs), there are sev-
eral  complicating  factors.  One  might  a  priori
have  an  assumption  of  modularity,  meaning
that  one  feature  is  encoded  in  one  dedicated
NCCC area. The idea that such single, maxim-
ally-informative  regions  exist  for  different  fea-
tures, however, is no more than an assumption.
It might turn out that perceptual coding—even
for single features—inherently involves processes
in multiple brain regions. 
Empirically, it is known that information
about objects is distributed across multiple re-
gions. One question is whether one brain region
can have information about more than one con-
tent (e.g., Haxby et al. 2001; Cichy et al. 2013).
In a study inspired by  Haxby et al. (2001) we
investigated  whether  object-selective  brain  re-
gions have information only about objects from
their  preferred  category  (Cichy et  al. 2013).
Participants viewed images from four different
categories:  objects,  visual  scenes,  body  parts,
and faces. These categories were chosen because
faces, body parts, and places are believed to be
processed by highly selective brain regions. We
found that  a  classifier  not  only  contained  in-
formation about a region’s preferred category:
take  the  example  of  the  face-selective  region
FFA. It was not only possible to classify faces
from this region, it was also possible to classify
the  difference  between  other,  non-face-related
objects, say between a chair and a window. The
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flipside  of  this  finding  that  individual  regions
encode multiple contents is that individual per-
ceptual contents were found in multiple regions.
For example, information about faces was also
found in  supposedly  “non-face-selective”  brain
regions (e.g., in the PPA). This presents a chal-
lenge to the idea that each content is represen-
ted in one region only.
However,  the  problem  might  not  be  as
severe as it first appears. It is actually expected
that  multiple  regions  will  contain  information
about each type of content. Different brain re-
gions do not exist in isolation, but are densely
causally interconnected (Felleman & van Essen
1991). Furthermore, in the visual pathway, stim-
ulus-related information will  reach higher-level
brain regions by way of low-level regions. Even
if  the FFA is the visual region that responds
most (albeit not fully) selectively to faces, the
presence of a face could also be inferred from
the discharge  pattern  of  ganglion  cells  in  the
retina.  Thus,  vertical  and horizontal  propaga-
tion of information is expected. One crucial cri-
terion, which has not received much attention,
is whether the information in different regions is
redundant or whether it is independent with re-
spect to a person’s perceptual experience. If one
hypothetical brain region, say the uniform uni-
corn  area  (UUA),  is  directly  responsible  for
visual  experiences  of  unicorns,  it  should  have
more information about a person’s unicorn ex-
periences than any other region. 
The  relationship  between  information  in
the UUA and other areas will reveal a lot about
the  nature  of  representation.  If  other  regions
also  have  information  about  unicorn  experi-
ences, and they receive their information about
unicorn experiences via the UUA, then the uni-
corn-related  information  in  the  other  regions
should  be  partially  redundant  to  that  in  the
UUA. A classifier should not be able to extract
more information about a person’s unicorn ex-
periences  by additionally  taking  other  regions
into  account,  over  and above  the  information
available from the UUA. If, in contrast, other
regions have information that goes beyond that
in the UUA that allow the system to improve
the  classification  of  unicorn  experiences,  it  is
likely  that  the  representation  itself  is  distrib-
uted across multiple brain regions. Another way
to put it is to distinguish between representa-
tional  and  causal  entanglement.  A  change  in
neural activity in  one region will  typically be
propagated  to  any  neighbouring  regions  with
which it is connected. This causal entanglement,
however, does not directly implicate representa-
tional entanglement. Only if it were not possible
to find an individual region where neural activ-
ity patterns is not fully informative of a specific
feature,  and  if  taking  into  account  the  joint
activity of  this region and another region did
provide  full  information,  would  this  provide
evidence for representational entanglement. 
7 Putting it together
As outlined above, when attempting to identify
the neural correlate of a particular content of
conscious experience, it is important to ensure
that brain representations in any candidate re-
gion  fulfil  certain  mapping  requirements.  Be-
cause we have no direct way of establishing this
mapping,  multivariate  decoding  provides  a
rough approximation that allows the linking of
perceptual  contents  to  population  brain  re-
sponses in different regions, and allows us to ex-
plore their  properties.  The data from our lab
provide several constraints for a theory of NC-
CCs.  Consistent  with  previous  suggestions
(Crick &  Koch 1995), the very early stages of
processing in V1 are presumably not directly in-
volved in encoding visual experiences.  Repres-
entations in these regions have more detail than
enters consciousness (Haynes & Rees 2005) and
might not change their information content dur-
ing perceptual learning when contents are suc-
cessively represented with more detail  in con-
sciousness (Kahnt et al. 2011). Please note that
early regions beyond V1 have to be NCCCs, be-
cause higher-level visual areas are invariant to
low-level visual features. This has not only been
shown in animals (Sáry et al. 1993), but also in
humans  using  classification  techniques  (e.g.,
Cichy et al. 2011). This invariance means that
high-level regions cannot simultaneously encode
the high-level, more abstract phenomenal prop-
erties  (such  as  whether  a  cloud of  points  re-
sembles a dog or a cat) and the low-level phe-
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nomenal properties (colour or brightness sensa-
tions). Multiple regions are needed to account
for the full multilevel nature of our perceptual
experience.  While  V1  is  presumably  excluded
from visual awareness, early extrastriate regions
(such as V2) are likely to be involved, because
they  still  encode  low-level  visual  information.
They also appear to filter out sensory informa-
tion that does not enter awareness, thus again
closely matching perceptual experience. For ex-
ample, V2 and V3 do not encode the orienta-
tion of invisible lines, whereas V1 does (Haynes
&  Rees 2005).  Similarly,  neural  object repres-
entations in the lateral occipital complex were
wiped out by visual masking that rendered an
object stimulus invisible (Bode et al. 2012). The
role of extrastriate and higher-level visual areas
in visual awareness is further highlighted by the
fact that they exhibit a certain convergence of
different  aspects  of  awareness.  Most  notably,
they employ a shared code for visual perception
and visual imagery (Cichy et al. 2012). 
While extrastriate and higher-level visual
regions jointly encode different feature levels of
visual awareness, there is evidence that a rep-
resentation in these regions is not sufficient for
visual awareness. For example, our experiments
on  perceptual  learning  (Kahnt et  al. 2011)—
where subjects are unable to access certain de-
tails  of  visual  stimuli—show  that  improved
sensory perception is not necessarily associated
with improved representation of information in
these  early  areas.  The  mechanism  through
which perception of details might be improved
lies beyond the sensory encoding stage, in the
prefrontal  cortex.  The  mechanism of  this  im-
provement is  not an improved sensory repres-
entation in  the prefrontal  cortex.  Contrary to
several  experiments  on  animals  (Pasternak &
Greenlee 2005),  our  experiments  consistently
fail  to  show  any  sensory  information  in  the
frontal  cortex.  For  example,  when  a  stimulus
survives visual masking and is consciously per-
ceived, there is no evidence for the additional
distribution of  information  into the  prefrontal
cortex  (Bode et  al. 2012;  Bode et  al. 2013;
Hebart et al. 2012) as would be expected if in-
formation is indeed made globally available in
the sense  of  a  “streaming model”  of  a  global
workspace (Dehaene & Naccache 2001). Even in
a  more  conventional  experimental  task,  based
on visual working memory, we were not able to
identify  sensory  information  in  the  prefrontal
cortex. Thus, the direct encoding of the visual
contents of consciousness, the NCCCs appear to
lie in sensory brain regions, at least as far as
can be told with the resolution of non-invasive
human neuroimaging techniques. On the other
hand,  our  results  suggest  that  the  prefrontal
cortex  is  involved  in  the  decision-making—as
has  been  suggested  before  (Heekeren et  al.
2004)—and in learning about sensory contents
(Kahnt et al. 2011). Thus, it appears to do so
without re-representing or encoding sensory in-
formation itself.
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